On regional integration in bank commercial lending by Dale K. Osborne
No. 8303






Federal Reserve Bankof Dallas
This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org) '...'.
No.  8303
0n Regional  Integration In Bank
Commerciai  Lendi  ng
by
Dale  K. 0sborne*
July 1983
*Consultant  to the Federal  Reserve  of Dallas  and  Director of the Center
for Financial  Institutions at 0klahona  State  Universitv.
The  author  is grateful to Robert  G. Feil for research  assistance  and
John  H. Wood.for  helpful  discussions.
This  is a working  paper  and  should  not be  quoted  or reproduced  in whole  or
in part wjthout  the  written consent  of the author. The  views  expressed  are
those  of the author  and  should  not be attributed to the Federa'l  Reserve
Bank  of  Dallas  or any  other part of the Federal  Reserve  System.OII REGIOI{AL  INTEGRATIOI{  11{
BAIIK  CO}IHERCIAL  LEi{DIiIG
Abst  ract
This paper  tests the hypothesis  that average  interest rates for
ten categories  of commercial  loans  (short-term  and  long-term  loans  in five
size classes)  in the regions  of the United  States  behave  as if  they were
generated  in an integrated  national  market.  The  tests, derived  fron two
model  s of  commercial  lending  'in an integrated  market,  indicate that al  I
regions  are highly integrated  in short-term  lending  in all  s'ize  classes.
In  long-term  lending, five  of  the  six  negions  appear  to  be highly
integrated  jn four of the five size classes. The  exceptional  region  is the
Southeast,  which seems  not only to  be poorly integrated v'rith  the other
negions  but also to be far  less homogeneous.  The  exceptional  loan-size
class is 0 to $10,000.ON  REGIOML  INTEGRATIOI{  II{
BANK  CO|,0{ERCIAL  tft{Dltlc
l.  I  nt  rodu  ct  i  on
An interesting hypothesis  about  Arnerican  banking  is  that  the
industry  operates  in  a single national market  for  cornmercial  loans, so
that,  directly  or  indirectly,  every bank  conpetes  with every other in
makjng  such  loans.  This hypothesis  cannot  be tested  with the datd novi
available.  The  only data  bearing  on it  (described  jn section  2 below)  ane
aggregated  at  the fegional level  ,  and  they pertain only to  the l  arger
banks.  t,le  sha  lI  therefore test  the hypothesi  s  that  these regional data
behave  as if  they were  generated  in an integrated  national  market.  The
truth of this  Integration  Hypothesjs  is  necessary  but not sufficient for
the truth of the stronger  hypothesis  we'd  like to test.
Doubts  about  the Integration  Hypothesjs  spning  mainly  frorn  the
legal restrictions on branching,  which,  together  wjth the reluctance  of
many bankefs to  lend  at  a  djstance,l  create  the  potential  fot'
geographical  ly  segregated  narkets.  There  are,  however,  at  I  east four
reasons  for considering  the hypothesis  plausible.  First,  the bankers  in
every  region  encounter  extra-regional  competition  fon all  classes  of  loan
customens.  In their 
'lending 
to nationally  known  firms, the bankers  must
compete  with the corporate  bond  and  corunercial  paper  markets;  jn  their
lending  to large regional  firms, they  must  compete  with the loan-production
offices and  travelling loan officers of  banks  from  other regions;  and  in
their  lending to  smal  l  regional firms,  they must compete  with  trade
creditors, who  lend to more  small  businesses  than financial institutions
do.  Second,  the practice of  sel  I  ing loans  or shares  of  loans  to othef-2-
bankers  tends to  integrate the  regions by di  recti  ng the  fl ow of  funds
toward  regions  whene  the demand  for conrnercial  loans  is high.  Third, bank
portfol  jo  substitution across  categories  of  assets  and across  bonrowers
within the loan category  tends to  integrate conrnercial  lending in  all
regions  with the national  asset  markets,  for commercial  loans  compete  with
debt secunities  priced  in these  makets. And  fourth, the cost of  funding
loans  (the marginal  cost of funds)  is essentially  the same  in al  1 regions.
It  differs among  banks,  but only according  to their balance  sheets  and  not
according  to their locations  as such,  for it  is establ  jshed  in the national
markets  for Federal  Funds  and  negotiable  certificates of deposit. All four
of  these considerations  spring from the same  source:  the search  for
profitable oppoftunities. If  the regions  are not jntregnated,  many  people
are overlooking  thein opportunities.
Recent  empirical research  on the subject is  inconclusive.  It
consists of one  study  that attempts  to test  the Integration Hypothesis  and
a large group  of  studies  that,  though  not directed  at  the hypothesis  as
such,  might  be  expected  to bear  on  it  by impl  ication.
The studjes in  the  large group are those that  attempt to
determine  whether  "local-market  concentration"  affects commercial  lending
(and  other"  banking  services).  As the existence  of  such  an effect would
refute the Integration  Hypothesis,  these  studies  demand  a brief  summary
evaluation. Taken  at face va1ue,  they are unfavorable  to the hypothesis,
for  the  majority of  them report a  statistically  significant  (though
numerical  ly  smal  l  )  concentration  effect.2  But the proportion  of  studies
reporting  such an effect  is  not  the  same  th'ing as the  propoftion of
successful  searches  for it,  for a given  study  typically undentakes  sevenal-J-
searches. The  proportion  of  successful  searches  may  be half or more  jn
some  particular studies,  but for the aggregate  of studies  publ  ished  in the
l5 years  to 1980  it  'is far less than  one  half.3  In addition,  the findings
do not seem  very reliab]  e.  Consider  for  instance  a study  by Paul  Meyer
(1967). Illeyen  regressed  commercial-loan  rates  on  concentration,  loan  size,
maturity, and  several  other variables.  He reported  separate  negression
equations for  four  sjze  cl  asses of  borrowens  and two years (1955  and
1957)--eight  regression  equations  in al  l.  Four  of these  equations  showed
statistical1y significant concentration  effects.  However,  three of these
four  were for  1955 and the  fourth  was for  1957 and a  diffenent
borrowen-size  class:  three classes of  borrowers  were "affected" by
concentration  in 1955  but not in 1957  and  a fourth class was  affected  in
1957  but not in 1955. This is not a very  rel  iable effect.4
As a  group, the  concentration  studies suffer  from too many
methodological  shortcomings  to  inspire much  confidence  in thein findings.
Thein proffered definitions of  concentration  and 'rlocal markets"  seem
arbitrary  and show  only the loosest connection  to  an econornic  theory of
behavior.5 l4oreover,  though  the studies  offer a theoretical r"ationale  of
sorts for the variables  employed  in their regression  equations,  they  offer
no national  e at  al  I  for  the forms  of  the eouations  or  for  the assumed
pnoperties of  the  error  terms.  In  short,  while  thein  general  1y
unsuccessful  search  for  concentration  effects  is  consistent  with  the
Integration  Hypothesis,  the evidence  is not very  strong.
The one recent study of  the  Integration Hypothesis  per  se
(Keleher, 1979) took its  basic theoretical  framework  from the theory of
economic  jntegration.  Thjs  theofy, though  developed  mainly  in the context-4-
of  jntennational  trade and  lendjng,  clearly provides  the right framework
and suggests  the general  character  of  the data and tests to  be used.6
Keleher's  results, though  somewhat  mixed,  were  general  ly  favorable  to the
Integration Hypothesis  according  to  the  critenia  employed.  Again,
howevef,  the  results are difficult  to  interpret because  the regression
equations  were  not expl  icitly  derived  fnom  a theory  of comnercjal  lending
in integrated  markets. The  variables  of the equations  vlere  so  derived,  but
the form  of the equations  and  the assumed  properties  of the error terms  are
a  nb  i  tra  ny.
2.  Data  and  Method  of Analvsis
The  only useful  data  for testing the Integration  Hypothesis  cone
fron  a  Federal Reserve  sunvey  conducted  quarterly during the  years
1967-L976. (Regional  interest-nate  data are avai  lable fon years  before
1967  and  after 1976,  but only in a more  aggregated  form  with respect  to
maturity  and  size of  loan.)  The  survey  covered  126  banks  in 35 reporting
centers  allocated  to  six  regions  (New  York  City, Other  Northeast,  North
Central  ,  Southeast,  Southwest,  and  West  Coast).  For each  region,  average
interest fates  viere  reported  for commercial  Ioans  in three  maturity  classes
and  fjve size classes. one  of the maturjty  cl  asses  was  "revo1  ving credit,"
which  we  shall not analyze. The  two  matut"ity  classes  that we  shall analyze
are "short term" (up to  one  year) and  "1ong  term" (over one  year).  The
five si  ze  cl  asses  are:E
Class  1:  $1000  - $9000
Class  2:  $10,000  - $99,000
Class  3:  $100,000  - $499,000
Class  4:  $500,000  - $999,000
Class  5;  $1  ,000,000  or mone
Thus  the survey  yielded  40 average  jnterest rates in each  of ten rnatunity-
size categories  in each  of six regions.T  l4ore  necent  data  (if  available  in
suitably disaggregated  form) would,  of  course,  be more  relevant  to  the
inquiry, for integration  is very  1ike1y  to be increasing  as the barriens  to
nationwjde  expans  i  on  fa11  .
The  survey  data pertain  to  loans  made  dur"ing  the first  half of
the middle  month  in each  quafter.  In addition  to the survey  data  we  shall
use  two series of  "r'isk-free"  rates:  the 3-month  Tneasury  bill  rate and
the 3-year  constant-maturity  yield on  Treasury  securities,  both  refefred  to
the middle  month  of  each  quarter.  These  rates may  a1  so be interpreted as
the opportunity  cost  of funds.
The sunvey  data are  not  control  I  ed for  non-  interest  terms of
lending  (such  as  compensating-ba'l  ance  arrangements  or  co'l  lateral
requirements)  and  thus permit no discrimjnation  between  these  and  other
possible  sources  of internegional  differences  in the rates.8 Conceptualiy,
we can divide all  sounces  of  interregional  differences  into two groups:
(1) those  that may  exist within a region,  such  as interbank  djfferences  jn
risk,  non-intefest terms, and the  distr"ibution  of  loans within  each
maturity-size  category,  and  (2) those  that exist only because  the regions
are poorly integrated.  l,le  assume  that  sources  of  the  fi rst  kind vary
randomly  over  the sample  period and  that soufces  of the second  kind do not
exist, thus  testing the Integration  Hypothesis  in its  null form.-6-
0n the Integration  Hypothesis,  then, movements  of  the average
rate in a specified  naturity-size  class  should  be  the same  in all  reg'ions.
Clearly, jf  each  region is  integrated  with a specified  region  then al  1
regions  afe integrated  with each  other.  Here  we take New  York  as the
specified  region.  l,le  test  the Integratjon  Hypothesis  by regressing  the
data for  region  k on the data for  New  York, where  r"egion  k  is  each  of  the
other  five regions  in turn.
The  regression  equation  that connects  the data  for  region  k and
New  York  must  be der"jved  from a model  of commercial  lending in  integt"ated
markets. Two  such  models  are  offered  below. one  (the  Rate  Model)  pnoduces
a  regr"ession  equation  in  the observed  interest rates; the  other (the
Pnemjum  Model) produces  a  regression  equation in  the  impl  ied  risk
pnemiums.  As neither rnodel  is  rejected by the data, both are used  to test
the I  ntegrati  on  Hypothesis.
3.  The  Rate  Model
The  Rate  Model  is a simple  optimization  rnodel  of bank  lending. A
given  bank  in region  k at time t  makes  nkt types  of loans  within a given
maturity  and  size class.  (The  loan  types  differ  with respect  to borrower
chardctefjstics  and  such  non-interest  terms  as collateral and  compensating
balances.)  Profit is assumed  to be separable  with respect  to naturity and
size class.  Fon  each  of the ten matunity-sjze  categories  the profit, rk
at time  t  'is
ftkt =  >.rktjlktj  - rt:.Lkrj  - 0t<t(Ltt),
JJ-7-
where  the summation  'is  over  j  from  1to  npg  and
rktj  = contract  lending  rate
Lktj  = amount  I  oaned
rt  = cost  of funds  (exogenous  to the bank)
Lrt  = (Lttr,  ...,  Lktnrt)
kt(flt)  = sum  of operating  costs  and  bad-debt  provisions.
The  first-order optimal  ity condition  for loans  of type  j  is
rt  I aot  t/alftj  = rktj + 1113arp13'/ilptj  - rt -  a{rt(Ltt)/rt-ttj = 0.
Define  eg; as the elastic'ity  of demand  for type  j  loans:
?Lltr




from  which  the regional  subscript,  k, is omitted  on  the irnplication  of the
Integration  Hypothesis  that the elasticity of demand  for a given  type of
loan is the same  in every  region. Also  defjne  variables  f1.1  and  yp1;  ,
(3) e1;  /  (r + e13)
f15  ag  s1(Lp1)/alktj  ,
so that (1) can  be  expnessed  in the equivalent  form,
(4) r1g5  = fg311  +  yktj,  j=1,...,nkt.
f t  i
vk  tj
because
shou  I  d
These  optimal  ity  conditions  cannot  be
of  the  banker"'s  irnperfect knowl  edge of
fail  only by a deviation  uktj  that yrould
expected to  hold  exactl  y
f1;  and yktj,  but  they
eventua  l1y  neach  zero if-8-
market  conditions  were  stable.  Inserting  upX.i  into eqs. (4), multiplying
each  equation  by Lttj,  adding  the resulting equations  oven  the n1g  loan
types,  and  dividing  the sum  by the totdl value  of loans,  we  obtain
(s) rkt=fktrt+Ykt+ukt,
where  r11 , fkt, ykt, and  up1  are  the value-weighted  averages  of rp1;',  f",,
yktj,  and  uktj,  respectively,  in a g'iven  bank  in region  k.  This  rnodel  is
stable  only if  fp1)0,  which  we  henceforth  assume.
Equation  (5) holds  within each  maturity-size  category  for a given
bank  in fegion  k.  If  it  is avenaged  over  all  the banks  jn that region  the
same  form wil'l  result,  so  let  us  simply reinterpfet  the  variables
accordingly. As  nejnterpreted,  eq. (5) expresses  the average  contract  rate
rp1 in region  k at time  t  in terms  of the marginal  cost  of funds  11,  which
is  common  to all  regions,  and  the variables  fg1, Jkt,  and  u11  that take
va1  ues  specific to region  k.  (The  value  of fp1 is  specific to the fegion
in spite of our assumption  that the elasticity of demand  for a given  type
of  loan is the same  for all  regions  because  this variable  depends  on the
djstnibution  of loan  types,  which  can  differ between  negions.)
When  appl  ied to regions  l  and  2, eq. (5) impl  ies
(6) rr,  = [111  - tztfLt/fzt  * utt - uztftt/fztf  * rztflt/f  zt.
Assuming  that f11/f21  has  a value  )\ that is  independent  of time, eq. (6)
has  the form  of a linean  regression  equation-9-
(7) rlt  =  4+ )rr21  + 6a,
where  d is the sample-period  average  value of the bracketed  term in  (6) and
the error term  €t is the time-t deviation  of the bracketed  term
omit the regional  subscripts  from a,  I,  and et  because  we
confine  our attention  to regions  l and  2, as  explained  below.
from d.  We
hencefo  rth
The  erfor term €t moves  inversely  to  y21 and uAt' vihich  are
positively correlated  with the independent  varjable 12t (see eq'  (5)).
Hence  the  error  term is  negatively correlated with  the  independent
variable.  The  ordinary  least squares  estimate  of tr is  therefore  biassed
.downward  and  the calculated  p2 lwhich  is proportional  to 12)  wi'l 
'l 
be  below
its  "true" value.9 These  biases,  which  are unfavorable  to the Integration
Hypothesi  s, ane  discussed  below.
The correlation betv'/een  independent  varjable and error  term
transmits  to  the error term any autocorrelation  that is  present  in  the
independent  varjable.  As the  independent  variable is  very strongly
autocorrelated  over the sample  period, we expect  the error term to  be
autocornelated  too.  This  autocorrelation  does  not, therefore,  necessarily
indicate  a defect in the model  or in the Integration  Hypothesis'  a1  though
such  a defect  cannot,  of course,  be  ruled  out a priori.
It  is  clear from  eq. (5) that fp1 is  positive, whence  )r jn the
regression  equation  (R) is atso  positive.  No  further properties  of )r, and
none  of o,  can be derived fron the model  .  The  value  of \  depends  on the
types  of loans  made  in regions  t  and  2; that of a depends  on these  types
and  on  the operating  costs  in the regions. Oun  data  provide  no  information
about  these  matters.In testing the Integration  Hypothesis  we  take New  York  City as
region  2 and  each  of the other regions,  in turn, as region  1.  Since  there
are five  "region  1s" and five  loan-size  classes,  thefe are twenty-five
regressions  for each  of the two  maturity  classes.  In each  regression  the
estimate  of \  should  exceed  0 statistical  ly.  The  adjusted  n2 @)  sfroutA
be high in al1 regressions  but it  should  not be as high in the long-term
negressions  as in the short.  This is because  of the tendency  of bankers  to
borrow  short.  This tendency  creates more  uncertainty about the costs of
funding long-term  loans, thus leaving room  for  greater differences  of
opinion  about  optjma'l  long-term  lending  rates.  Such  differences  produce
larger error terms.  Therefore,  jf  the model  is  correct, the long-term
regnessions  should  have  smal'ler  T2s.
Table I  gives the  details of  the twenty-five regressjons  in
shont-term  rates.  As all  but four of these  regressions  had  unacceptedly
'I 
ow  Durbin-Watson  statistics when  estimated  by  ordjnary  least squares,  they
were  reestimated  by the Cochrane-Orcott  method.  All the tabulated  details
refer to the re-estimated  equations. The  column  headed  "Rho"  contains  the
Cochrane-Orcutt  estimates  of the finst-onder"  autocorrelation  coefficients.
As the table shows,  every  T2 > .S8  and  every  estimated  )r  is significantly
gfeaten  than 0.  Judging  by the significance  of  I  and  the fit  of  the
equations, we cannot reject  the jo'int  hypothesis  that  the Rate  Model  is
tnue  and  the regions  are integrated  in short-term  lending.
Tab.l  e  2  shows  the  twenty-five  regressions in  the  long-term
rates.  Here  again the Cochrane-0rcutt  estimates  are reported  for  the
equations  that suffered  from  significant first-order autocorrelation  (these
are the nine equations  for  which  an estimate  of  rho is  reported).  The- 11-
estimates  of I  shown  in Table  2, 
.1 
ike those  shown  in Table  l,  statistically
exceed  0 at the five  pencent  level  .  The  T2s, though  large enough  by most
standards,  are noticeably  lower  than  those  of Table  1.  As  exp.lajned  above,
thjs  difference  in TZs is  consistent  with the Integration  Hypothesis  and
the Rate  Model;  indeed,  it  is required  by  the model  .
The  model  does  not explain the considerably  lower  T2s of  the
Southeast  and  Class  1 regressions  in Table  2.  One  way  to evaluate  these
interregional  ,  intfaclass  regressions is  to  compare them  with
intraregional  , interclass  regressions  of the sarne  form.  Let us reinterpret
eq. (7) by  defjning  r2t as the contract  rate fof loans  in size-class  2 and
rlt  as the contract  rate for  loans  in a different size class but in the
same  region. The  indicated  regressions  should  not be better than  those  of
Table  2 jf  the Integration  Hypothesis  is true.  Clear'ly,  only the long-term
regressions  need  to be  evaluated  jn this manner.
Table  3 reponts  the intraregional  regressions. Exanining  first
the Southeast  regressions,  note  their  low  T2s as compared  with those  of
other  regions.  This  region  is  far  less  homogeneous  than any of  the
others.10 Even  so, no Southeast  T2  in Table  3 differs  significantly at
the S-percent  level from its  counterpart  jn Table  2.  t,le  cannot  reject the
hypothesis  that southeastern  Class  i  (i=1  ,3,4,5) rates  move  as closely  with
New  York  Class  i  rates as they  do  with southeastern  Class  2 rates.  This,
of course,  is cold  comfort  in view  of the heterogeneity  of the Southeast.
Turning  next  to the Class  1 regressions  of Table  3, we  note  that
the 0ther Nontheast,  North Central  ,  Southeast,  and Southv,,est  T2s show  no
tendency  to be  lower  in the Class  I  regressions  than  in the regressions  for
Classes  3, 4, and  5.  Moreover  the  I2s  are higher  than  their countenpants-t?-
of Table  2.  The  Class  l  rate jn each  of these  r"egions  moves  more  closely
with the Class  2 rate there than  with the Class  1 nate  in New  York.  The
problem,  however,  seems  to  1ie mainly  wjth the New  York  Class  I  rate,
which,  as shown  in Table  3, doesn't  move  with New  York  Class  2 rates as
closely  as  the other  New  York  rates  do.  In other  words,  the re1  atively 1ow
Class  1T2s in Table  2 appear  to result, in part, fron some  peculianity  in
the New  York  Class  1 rates as reflected  in Table  3.  (Tab1e  3 indicates  a
similar pecul  iarity  in the West  Coast  Class  1 rates.)  Fina11y,  in  all
regions  but the Southeast  and  al1 Classes  except  l,  a comparison  of the
corresponding  R-Zs  of  Tables  2 and  3 reveals  no pattern.  0f  the twelve
pairs of corresponding  T2s, seven  are higher  in Tabl  e 3, three  are lower,
and two  are  equal  .  In  no  case do  the  members  of  a  pai  r  di  ffen
significantly at the 5-percent  level  .
In summary,  the long-tefm  rates display  two anomal  ies:  (f)  the
Southeast  does not  seem  welI  integrated with  the  rest  of  the  country,
possibly  because  it  is not itsel  f  a we1  1-integrated  region,  and  (2) rates
on the smal  lest  loans in the other regions  do not seem  to move  very closely
with  those in  New York and the  l,lest Coast, possibly because  of
pecul  iarities  in the smal  I 
'loans 
of these  regions.  The  short-term  rates
display  no  anomal  ies.  As  far as the Rate  Model  goes,  therefore,  we  cannot
reject the Integration  Hypothesis  in  relation to  short-term  loans  of any
size in any  region;  and  while we  cannot  reject the hypothesis  in relation
to  l ong-term  I  oans we fi nd  it  somewhat  doubtful when  referred to  the
Southeast  on  to the smallest  loans.-13-
4.  The  Premi  um  Model
Commercial  loans by  banks are  substitutes for  equity  and
marketable  debt as sources  of  funds  for borrowens.  As uses  of  funds  by
banks, these 
'l 
oans are substitutes fon securities that  are themselves
substitutes  for  corporate  instruments  in  the financjal markets.  Hence
commerc'ial  loans must be priced jn  a manner  that  does  not depart too far
from the pricing  relations governing  tradable instnuments. l'le shall
consider  two such  relations, namely  those  deriving  from  the Capital  Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM)  and the  Pr"oportional  ity  Model  of  Tradable  Debt
(PMTD).11
CAPI4.  Suppose  the expected  return, Eip1, on the ith  loan in
region k at time t  is governed  by
(8) Eitt - Rt = 0itt(Emt  - R1)  + ui11,
where  R1 is  a  risk-free  rate,  Erl  is  the expected  return on the marKet
portfol  jo, €ltt  js the beta  of the loan (i.e.,  its systematic  fisk relative
to that of the narket),  and  ui11  is a nandom  variable  avenaging  zero  in the
long  nun. The  random  vaniable  is  in this equation  because  bank  loans  have
only  the bilateral negotiations  of banker  and  borrower  to keep  them  in line
with tradab'le  instnuments,  and  though  these  negotiations  are successful  in
the long run if  the Integration  Hypothesis  js true (and  credit conditions
are stable), they lack the period-to-period  accuracy  possessed  by trading
in open  markets.- t4-
If  eq. (8)  is  averaged  over all  the loans in  the regjon, the
result has  the same  form  as (8) except  that subscript  j  is omitted  in order
to show  that Ekt,  p11, and  ukt are regional  averages'  The  regional  avel'age
expected  return, Ep1, is  not observable  but is  related to  the observed
average  contract nate, rp1  , bJ
(9)  rp1  = Ep1  + dps,
where  dp1 is  the average  deviation of  the contnact  rate frorn  the expected
return  and  is veny  1ike1y  to be positive.  Defining  the premiums'  pkt and
Pt'  bY
(10)  Pkt = rkt - Rt,  P1  = E61  - R1'
we  obtajn  from  (8) the relation
(11)  pkr =  Pktpt  + dkt + ukr.
With  v1  defi  ned  as
(12)  vt = d1t -  d71tsy/9y + u1t -  u21F11/P21,
eq. (11)  impl  ies
(13)  plt  = vt + p21  011/F21.
Assume  that 116/  ll2t  has  a constant  value  /J  over  the sample  period,  definea
as the  average  value of  v1  over the  sample  peliod,  and define  61 as
vt - d.  tle  then have  the linear  regression  equation  (14),
(14)  plt  =  a+ fpZt + 6t.-15-
The  error term,  6t,  is  inversely  nelated  to d21  + u2t, which  is positively
correlated  with p21 (see  eqs. (11) and (12)).  Hence  the error term and
independent  variable are negatively  correlated  and the  ordinary least
squafes  estimate  of f  is bjassed  downward.  This  bias lowers  the R2  of the
regression  equation  (which  is  pr"oportional  to  B\  and is,  therefore,
unfavorable  to the Integration  Hypothesis  as  we  test it.
The assumption  that  ll;1/  ll2g is  constant  over the sample  period
is, of course,  weaker  than  the assumption'  so  often invoked  in tests of the
CAPM,  that the indjvidual betas are stationary.  (See  Cheng  and  Grauer
(1980)  for a discussion.)
PI4TD.  The  Pnoportional  ity  Model  of Tradable  Debt  derives  from
the assumptjon  that D11,  the market  value  of bonrower  k's debt  at time t'
is proportional  to the va1ue,  D1  , of rjsk-free debt  that prom'ises  the same
stream  of payments.  The  proportionality  is expressed  as
(15) D11  = H(xp1)D1  ,
where  xp1  is a vector  of charactenist.ics  of borrower  k'  not jncluding  the
maturity  of the debt,  and  H(xkt)  < 1.  (tn ttris discussion  maturity  is held
constant.  )  Assuming  continuous  compounding,
_p,.  -Tkt
(16)  Dt = Fkt e 
'""
wnene
Tkt = maturity  of borrower  k's debt
Fp1  = face  value  of borrowen  k's debt
Rp1  =  yield on riskless  debt  of maturity  T11.-16-
With  rp1  denoting  the promised  yield on  borrower  k's debt,  we  have
(17)  rkt = ln(F11/D11)/Tp1.
Equations  (r5) -  (17)  imply
(18)  rkt - Rkt  = hs1/Tp1,
where
hkt=-lnH(xkt)>9.
Choose  a fixed maturity T (three months  fon the short-tem regressions,
three years for the 
.long-term) 
and  put
ak1  =Tk1/T  >0
wkt=hkt/akt>0,
so that  (18  ) becomes
(19)  rkt - Rkr  = w1s/T.
Now  let  us feinterpnet (19) so that  rpl  js  the average  promised  yield
(contract  interest rate) in region  k and  R;.1  js the r"isk-free  rate  on  loans
with maturity equal  to  the average  matufjty of  the loans in  region  k.
Letting RX  be the yield on thnee-period  Treasury  instruments  (three-month
bills  for the short-tern  regressions  and  tht"ee-year  bonds  for the long-term
negnessions),  and  introducing  the variable  cp1  to account  for  differences
in the region-k  average  maturitjes  from  thnee  periods,  we  can  write1''
Hence,
(20)
Rp1  = R1  + cpg.
by substitution  in (19)  and  the definition of pp1  in (10),
rkt - Rt = Pkt = w1a1/T  + c11.
Solving  this equation  simultaneously  with k=1  and  k=2,  we  obtain
(21  ) p11  = [c11 -  cltwIt/wlt7  + p2tv'7t/vt1t.
With  the average  value  oven  time  of the bracketed  term  identified  as o, the
time-t deviation  from  that avendge  as 61, and  the (assumed)  time-invarjant
value  of wLt/w?t  as B, (21)  has  the form  of eq. (14).
From  eqs, (20)  and  (21) it  is clear that the error term  is again
negatively  correlated  with  the  independent  variable.  Thus  whether  we
derive  eq. (14) from  the CAPlt4  or the PMTD,  we  expect  the ordinary  least
squares  estimate  of P to  be biassed  downward  and  the calculated  12 to  Ue
lower  than  it  would  be if  the estimate  of B  were  unbiassed,  l^le  al  so  expect
the long-term  regressions  to have  somewhat  lower  T2s, on the same  reasoning
that was  offered in connection  with the Rate  Model  .
Table 4  neponts  the  regression  analysis of  eq.  (14)  for
short-term  premiums  (New  York  City is  regjon  2).  All  but three of the
regressions  had  unaccepted.ly  low  Durbin-l,latson  statistics when  estimated  by
ordinary  Ieast  squares and were  reestirnated  by  the  Cochrane-Orcutt
method.12 The  T2s have  been  adjusted for  the degree  of  freedom  lost  in
estinating  rho.  As shown  in the table, the  T2s are very hi9h, though  not
quite so high as for eq. (7), and  all  the estjmated  Bs are signifjcantly
greater  than zero.  These  results provide  no grounds  for  reiecting the
Integration  Hypothesis  and  the Premium  Model  .-18-
Table  5 shows  the regression  results  for 
.long-term  premiums.  The
comparison  with Table  4 is substantially  the same  as that of Table  2 with
Table  1:  the  TZs of the long-term  regressions  are lower  than  those  of the
short-tern regressions,  and the difference is  especially pronounced  in
size-class  I  and  in the Southeast. Again,  however,  when  we  compare  these
interregional  regressions  with jntraregional  regressions  of the same  form
(which  ane  reported  in Table  6,  where  the independent  variable  refers to
si  ze-cl  ass 2), we fi nd no dj  fferences  worth  tal  k  ing about  that have  not
al  ready  been  discussed  in connection  with the Rate  Model.
5.  Additional  Test  s
Equdtion  (14), which  was
may  al  so be obtained  from  the Rate
rt  from  both  sides  of (5) and  put
pkt=rkt_rt,
so th  at
obtained above f nom
Model  .  Retu  rni  ng to
the Pfemium  Model  ,
secti  on  3,  subtract
pkt
(  Here  \de  have
negat  i  vity  of
= (ftt  - 1)r1  +  yg1  + up1  .
fp1-1)0,  which  follows  from  our assumption  that f11)0  and
the el  asticity of demand.  )  This  equatjon  impl  ies
the
p1t  = [vlt - vztfftt-r)/ (fzt-l) + utt - u21(f11-i)/(f21-1)]
+ p21(f11-1)/(fzt-1).
|  ?7\- 19-
Assurne  that (f11-1)/(f2g-1)  has  a constant  value  B, define  the time-average
value  of the bracketed  term  of eq. (22)  as o, and  let the time-t deviation
of  the bracketed  term from jts  average  be d1, and  we  obtajn eq. (14).
lJnder  this  new  interpretation  of  the coefficients of  eq.  (14), we may
subject  the Integration  Hypothesis  to three  further tests A, B, and  C.
(A).  Since  both f11 and fpg-1 are positive, a  comparison  of
eqs. (6) and  (22)  shows  that the X jn eq. (7) should  be related  to the p in









As Tables  2 and  5 show,  these  relations hold for  22 of  the 25 long-term
regressions.l3  The  three regressions  for which  the relations  fail  are (i)
the Other  Northeast  Class 1,  where )r =  .333 but  0 =  .53S, (ii)  the
Southeast  Class 2,  where  )r =  .817 but  6  (=  .815) does not differ
significantly fnom  1, and  (iii)  the Southwest  Class  1, where  )r= .009  but
F =.teO.  The  exceptions  are  thus  confined  to Class  1or  the Southeast.
(B).  |^lhen  B does  not differ  sjgnjfjcantly from  l,  the constant
term a derived  from  eq. (22) should  not differ significantly from  that (o)
derived  fnom  eq. (6).  In Table  5,  there are six  regressions  in  whjch
B  does not  djffer  signjfjcantly  from 1.  In  every one of  these six
(c)
'y does  not differ  statjstically  from  the value  of a  in the
regression  shown  in Table  2.
The  error terms  61  and  e1 are related  as follows:
regressions,
corresponding
6t - €t = (X- f)(uzt +  yzt - uZ  - yZ).-?o-
0n  the whole,  the estimate  of \ exceeds  that of d, so (\ - p) magnifies  the
time-t deviations  of u2t and  yzt frorn  their means  u2 and  y2.  Thjs causes
the absolute  value  of 01  to exceed  that of €1  and  implies  that the  T2 for"
eq. (14) should  be less than that for eq. (7).  This is  exactly  what  we
have  found,  and  it  explains  why  eq. (7) fits  the data  betten.
6.  Concl  udi  ng  Comments
1.  Under  the  interpretation of  eq.  (14) proposed  in  the
preceding  sectjon,  the var"iables  pkt ane  not premiums  over the risk-free
nate  but are interest  rnargins  (lending  rates  minus  the oppot"tunity  cost of
funds).  The fegnession  analysis of  eq. (i4)  shows  that these  mafgins
behave  as if  they were  the risk  premiurns  determined  by the CAPM  ot"  PMTD  --
i.e.,  as if  they  were  generated  by  tnading  in open  markets.
?.  As noted  above,  the least-squares  estimates  of  I  and  !  are
biassed  downwand  because  of the negative  covarjance  between  the independent
variable  and  the error term.  However,  when  the error term is small the
bias should  also be small.  Small  error terms  nean  high  TZs, as in the
short-term  regressions,  so, w.ith  some  risk,  we can try  to  interpret the
meaning  of the short-term  estjmates  on  the assumption  that their biases  are
smal  l.  Focusing  on p, which,  as explained  above,  has  a more  interesting
interpretation  than L  we  see  from  Table  4 that the estimates  diffet' but
little  from  1.  (0nly  I of the 25  values  djffer sjgnjficantly  from  1at  the
five  pefcent  level  ;  of these, only three differ  by nore than  10%,  and  they
ane  alI for Class-l  regnessions.  )  A I of I means  that regions  I and  2 face
the  same  average  el  asticity  of  demand  for  loans (on the rnost  recent
interpretation  of eq. (la)) or that they  deal in loans  of the same  average-21-
riskiness  (on  the Section  4 interpretation  of eq. (14).  Equal  el  asticities
or risk clearly do  not justify  nejection  of the Integration  Hypothesis.
3.  In order  to test the assertion  that the long-term  regressions
contain  nore ordinary-least-squares  bias, we re-estimated  eq.  (14) fon
long-term  rates by the  instrumenta'l  -variable method.  0ur instrunental
variable  was  taken  to be  the average  long-term  rate for all  the regions  (in
a given s'ize  c1  ass) minus  the risk-free rate.  There  is,  of course,  no
guarantee  that thjs  variable is  correlated  wjth the independent  varjable
but not with the error term.  For what  they are wonth,  the results of the
instfumental-vaniable  regressions  for  the Other Northeast  and Southwest
regions  are shown  in  Table  7.14  Apart from  the estimates  for Class  1,
which  are  still  anoma'lous,  these  Fs  and  Bs  exceed  their counterparts  shown
i  n  Tabl  e  5.  Most of  them reach the  nei  ghborhood  of  the  shont-term
estimates  shown  in  Tab'le  4,  thus providing further^  support for  the
I  nteg  rat  i  on Hypothes  i  s.
4.  The regions  appear  to  be wel  I  integrated  in  short-term
lending.  |^lhjle  the regions  are generally  we1  1  integrated  in  long-term
lending  there appear  to be two anomal  ies:  (1) The  Southeast  is  not very
well integrated  with the othen  regions  and  indeed  appears  not to be very
homogeneous.  (2) All  regions  are  poor'ly  integrated  in long-term  lending  of
smalI loans (under  $10,000).  These  anonalies  rema'in  as a challenge  to
fu  rther res  ea  rch  .Tabl  e 1. Estimates  of Equation  (7) for Shoft-Term  Rates
(Sta  nda  rd Errors  in Parentheses)
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(  .013  )
(.011)
(.022)
(  .464  )
(.134)
(  .106  )
(.083)
(.173)







(  .14e  )
(.101)
(  .087  )
(  .040  )
(.028)
(  .032  )
(.040)
(  .035  )
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ooTabl  e 2. Estimates  of Equation  (7) for Long-Term  Rates














































































(  .148  )
(  .044  )
(  .041  )
(.052)





(  .385  )
(  .088  )
(.044)
(  .045  )
(.04i)
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(  .380  )
(.814)
(.3e7)
(  .3e5  )
(.546)
(  .388  )
(.166  )
(.036)
(  .040  )
(.03e)
(  .047  )
(  .107  )
(.048)
(  .048  )
(  .067  )
(.048)Table  3.  lntraregional  Estimates  of Equation  (7) for Long-Term  Rates,
l,lhere  Size  Class  2 is the Indeoendent  Variable
(Standard  E  rrors in Parentheses)
Si  ze
Cl  ass
E  st  irnates
Reg  i  on
New  Yo  rk
0the  n














































































































(  .038  )
(  .046  )




(  .440  )
(.110  )
(.035)




(  .766  )
(1.07)
(.053)
(  .073  )
(.073)





(  .081  )
(  .086  )




(1  .87  )
(1.37)




(  .348  )
(.64e)
/  q?P  1
(  .063  )
(.048)
(  .065  )
,  (.053)
(  .538  )
(.40e)




















West  Coa  stTable  4.  Estinates  of Equation  (14)  for Short-Term  Rates








































































(.037  )  .520
(.138)
(.063)
(  .054  )
(  .048)
(  .078  )
(  .053  )
(.034)
(  .037  )
(.025)
(.024)
(  .23e  )
(.117)
(  .086  )
(.053)
(  .448  )
(  .076  )
(.072)
(  .071  )
(.066)
(  .058  )
(  .346  )
(  .328)
(  .203  )
(  .164)
(.123)










(  .047  )
(.045)
(  .047  )
(  .036  )












































































.98Tabl  e 5. Estimates  of Equation  (14)  for Long-Term  Rates














































































































(.  165  )
(.058)
(  .056  )
(.082)
(.072)





(  .118  )
(.062)
(  .060  )
(.073)
(  .064  )
(.155)
(.116)














(  .048  )
(  .063  )
(  .063  )
(.071)








(  .070  )
(  .173  )
(.0e8)
(  .140  )
(.184)



















Table  6.  Intraregional  Estimates  of Equation  (14)  for Long-Term  Rates,
Where  Size  Class  2 is the IndeDendent  Variable
(Standard  E  rrors in Parentheses)
Si  ze Estimates
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(  .145  )
(.215)
(.32?)
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l^le  st  CoastTable  7.  Instrumental  Variable  Estjmates  of Equation  (14)  for
Long-Term  Rates  (Standard  Errors  in Parentheses)
Si  ze E  st  i  mates
Regi  on  C  lass  a  tl  d*  D|.l  E-
Other  I  -I .77 (.542)  3.39  (.333)  .77  L.82  .72
Northeast  2  .537  (.104)  .998  (.041)  1.78  1.85  .94
3  .220  (.r31)  .egs  (.0s2)  1.67  1.61  .el
4  .332  (.174)  .893  (.073)  2,01  2.01  .79
s  .sre (.141  )  .826  (.05e)  2.1,r  l.e9  .83
*d = 2(rho-1)
1  -2.30  (.776)  3.63  (.502)  1.07  1.e1  .57
2  .437 (  .1321  .  988  (  .052  )  I .8e  l .93  .90
3  .362  (.0es)  .924  (.038)  2.43  1.70  .94
4  .314  (.r80)  .e66  (.075)  2.01  2.00  .81
5  .728  (.156)  .756  (.065)  2,r7  2.01  .78
So  uthwestFOOTNOTES
1.  The  great majority of banks  (sma1  ler banks)  do not
businesses  located  outside  their  "normal trading
bel  ieving  that a loan  appl  ication fr.om  outside  this area
hazard:  the applicant  must  be too r.isky  for  the banks
a  reas  incl  ude  him.
nonmal  ly
man  i fest  s
whose
lend to
pos  s  i  bly
moral
tradi  ng
2.  See  Rhoades  (1977)  for a tabulation.  Not  all  of the studies  deal  with
conunercia  l  I  end  i  nq.
3.  See  0sborne  and  Wendel  (1982)  for an elaboration  of this point.  I  do
not mean  to  suggesl  that  the status of a hypothesis  can  be settled by the
proportion  of tests that it  fails  to pass. It  is just that this pr-oportion
helps  to determine  the "sty1  ized  facts.,'
For neports  and  appraisals  of the earlien empirical  studies, see
Flechsig  (1965),  Phittjps (t967), and  Taylor (1969). Flechsig  and  Taylor
found  no evidence  of a concentration  effect but did report a significant
regional effect,  which js  just  as  unfavorable  to  the  Integnation
Hypothesi  s.
4.  Loan  size, on the other hand,  hdd  a significant negative  effect on
interest  rates in  both of  the years studjed  by Meyer. 0n the face of  it,
this  effect must  be attributed to  the greater risks or higher  operating
costs associated  with smal  l  loans, for  the only other thing that could
cause  rates  to be higher  on such  loans  js a weakness  jn competition,  which-t-
was  purpor"tedly  represented  by the concentration  variable  and  which,  as we
have  seen,  exercised  no  stable  effect.  But  this attribution would  be  hasty
in view  of the doubtful corresoondence  between  concentration  and  a weakness
of  competition;  it  would  however,  agree  with the  findings of  Benston
(1e64).
5.  Bankers  often refer  to  their  norma.l  trading areas as their  local
narkets, and thjs  seems  to  have led  the  concentration  researchers  to
identify  a trading ar"ea  with the concept  of  a market  as used in economic
theory.  See Osborne  and Wendel  (1982) for  a  discussion  of  market
i  denti  fication.
6.  Keleher  provides  a useful survey  of thjs theory.  Kenen  (1976)  figufes
prominently  in the survey  and  should  be  consulted  as a general  reference.
7.  Essentially  a1l of  the  sample  banks  had at  least $40 million  of
commercial  loans  outstanding  in 1967. See  the Federal  Reserve Bulletins
for May  i967  and  June  1971  for a description  of the survey.
Rates  reported  to the Fed  on a discount  basjs were  recomputed  to  give
effective rate.  This is the only control  beyond  size and  maturity.
9.  See  Koutsoyiannis  (1973,  pp.  73-74).
8.
the-3-
10.  Davis  (1965)  also found  the Southeast  to be different.  Perhaps  it
real  1y  wi  I  I  ri  se  agai  n.
11.  This model  is  not usually  dignified with a name,  far  less the name
hene  attached  to  it.  See  Garbade  (1982,  Ch. 19) for  a discussion  of
this rnodel  in connection  with option  pricing.
12.  As  in the Rate  Model  , the autocorrelation  of the nesiduals  may  spring
from autocorrelation  of  the  independent  variable and the  correlation
between  this variable  and  the errof term.
13.  The  short-term  regressions  are not examined  in this or the tvro  tests
to follow  because  of their good  fits.
14.  0nly these  two  negions  were  examined.  Since  the results  contained  no
surprises, further  work along these I  ines  did  not  seem  worth the
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